Information Precision and Asymptotic Efficiency of Industrial Markets by Tunca, Tunay I. - Stanford University
 
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org 
 
 
 
Working Paper #04-11 
 
October 2004 
 
Information Precision and Asymptotic Efficiency of Industrial Markets 
 
Tunay I. Tunca 
 
Stanford University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, 
http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network 
industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” 
comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and 
on network issues in general. 
Information Precision
and
Asymptotic Efficiency of Industrial Markets
Tunay I. Tunca∗
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
August, 2004
Abstract
Online market places have an unprecedented power of bringing together a large number of
buyers and sellers and aggregating information. Despite its benefits, this scale of aggrega-
tion of private information may bring about adverse effects that can cause inefficiencies,
which can be ignored by conventional analysis. In this paper, I present a strategic model
of a large industrial market with asymmetric information to examine (i) the validity of
the conjecture of price-taking behavior in such markets as the number of agents becomes
large; (ii) the effect of the rate that individual information precision decreases with in-
creased number of agents on convergence to price-taking and efficiency. I show that in
an industrial market with downstream competition, increasing the number of sellers may
make all participants price-takers in the limit, but increasing the number of buyers may
not. When the total precision of information in the market is high, price taking and
full social efficiency is achieved in the limit with large numbers of buyers and sellers.
However, if the total precision of information in the market is poor, large inefficiencies,
including full inefficiency, can occur in the limiting outcome. The rate of decrease of
individual information precision with increased number of agents determines the rate of
convergence to efficiency, and the convergence is slower than that predicted by the single
unit trading models in the literature.
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1 Introduction
The use of electronic markets for procurement is growing. According to a recent survey done
by ISM and Forrester research, in the third quarter of 2003, 33% of the large companies used
web-based marketplaces and 84% used the Internet for some form of procurement.1 Among
many benefits that these markets provide, an important one is their power for aggregating
information. By enabling a large number of buyers and sellers with diverse characteristics
and geography to virtually converge and trade in a centralized marketplace, Internet based
markets for both consumer and business transactions have an unprecedented potential for
aggregating private information and providing market efficiency. On the other hand, broad
usage of private information may also have some undesired effects. Specifically, the presence
of private and asymmetric information in a marketplace can create adverse selection, which
may reduce the participants’ willingness to trade and decrease market liquidity. This can
lead to market underperformance and, in the extreme, even to market failure. The goal
of this paper is examining the role of private information that is highlighted by the use of
centralized electronic procurement markets and exploring the effect of private information on
market performance. We also aim to identify a clear and quantitative theoretical measure
of price-taking that can be used as a yardstick for market competitiveness and analyze its
nature in large markets.
Many models of economies with large number of agents assume price-taking behavior.
This assumption usually is based on the intuition that when the agents are small compared
to the size of the economy, their individual trade sizes are so small that the price impact is
negligible. A conceptually distinct support for the price-taking assumption is that increasing
the number of agents in the economy makes them so competitive that even small changes in
their “quoted” price causes dramatic declines in the quantities they can sell or buy, i.e., their
demand or supply curves as a function of price are nearly vertical and they are nearly true
price-takers. In this paper, I present a strategic model of a vertical industrial market with
upstream and downstream competition to question the validity of both of these arguments
under private information and show that neither of these two has to hold with a large number
of agents. In particular, I show that the specific way the precision of total information in the
economy changes with the increased number of agents, together with the payoff structure that
characterizes such markets can have important consequences for price-taking and efficiency
as the number of agents in the market becomes large.
To demonstrate the effect of private information on price-taking behavior in industrial
markets, I build and analyze a model of vertical trade in an industrial setting: There are
N manufacturers who compete as a Cournot oligopoly in a consumer market with uncertain
demand. M upstream suppliers provide a homogenous intermediate good via identical con-
1Bartels A., R. Hudson and T. Pohlmann (2003), Report on Technology in Supply Management: Q3 2003.
Technical Report, ISM/Forrester.
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stant marginal cost technologies. The realization of the marginal cost coefficient is uncertain,
reflecting the variation on the price of certain common inputs (for instance oil, energy or raw
materials). The agents have private (but correlated) signals about the relevant uncertainty
that they are facing. Specifically, each buyer has an imperfect signal about the realization
of the consumer demand, and each seller has an imperfect signal about the realization of the
marginal cost.
To explore the emergence and nature of price-taking behavior in this market, we have to
endogenize price taking through a strategic model. To do this, I employ a common approach
and use demand and supply curves as the strategies of the participants (see, e.g., Kyle
1989, Vayanos 1999). This results in each participant’s facing a downward sloping residual
demand curve or an upward sloping residual supply curve when making her quantity decision.
Therefore, for each agent, increasing the quantity he sells (buys) decreases (increases) the
market price. The lower the price-impact of the trades for an agent, the closer she is to being
a price-taker. This constitutes a concrete measure of price taking, namely, the price impact
of the trades, whose magnitude emerges endogenously in equilibrium. As a result, (near)
perfectly elastic supply where all agents are price-takers in the limit and (near) perfectly
inelastic supply where trading even the smallest quantities can have arbitrarily large price
impact in the limit and everything in between can arise endogenously in equilibrium as the
number of agents in the market becomes large.
A key issue is the trade-off between two forces that affect the price-taking behavior of
the agents: First, consistent with the common wisdom, as the number of sellers increases,
competition forces the supply functions of the sellers to become steeper. This effect not only
pushes the sellers towards being price-takers, but also, since their residual supply curves (as
functions of the price) become steeper, pushes the buyers towards being price-takers. The
second and the opposing force is the effect of information aggregation in the market and
the agents’ reaction to that when determining their optimal quantities conditional on the
realization of the market outcome. If a seller puts higher quantity in the market, this signals
her willingness to produce and the increased possibility of her having a low cost signal. This
increases the remaining sellers’ belief that the cost realization will be low. As a consequence,
the prices are pushed lower. The higher the magnitude of this adverse selection effect the
farther the suppliers will be pushed away from being price-takers. The growth rate of the
magnitude of this effect as the number of suppliers increases compared to the rate that
the competition pushes the suppliers towards being price-takers determines the price-taking
behavior in the limit. A symmetric argument applies for the buyers.
The reaction of the participants to the market outcome is determined by their expectations
on the behavior of the other agents in the market. When the private information that each
of the remaining agents possesses is relatively accurate, each one of them will respond to her
signal by reacting strongly to it. That is when a buyer has an accurate signal about consumer
demand, she will increase her quantity to buy by a sizeable amount when she receives a high
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signal and vice versa, and therefore her trading quantity has a sizable ex-ante variance. On
the other hand, when a trader’s signal is not very accurate, she does not respond to it strongly,
and her trading quantity becomes more predictable to the other agents. Aggregated over all
agents, the residual supply or demand curve that each agent is facing will be more predictable
if the accuracy of the signals is low. As a consequence, any deviation will signal a strong
realization of the underlying variable and result in a strong reaction by the remaining agents.
In the limit, this can become so extreme that smallest quantities can have very large impact
on prices, and consequently the market performance can suffer dramatically.
Here, the way individual information precision decreases with the number of agents be-
comes important. Intuitively, one could argue that as the number of competitors in a market
increases, their incentives to acquire more precise information along with the gains from us-
ing such precise information decreases. Given this premise, depending on the cost function
for information acquisition, the total information in the market can increase, stay the same
or decrease with increased number of agents.2 Combined with the specifics of the market
and payoff structure in industrial markets (e.g., the effect of downstream competition), this
can result in significant changes in the way agents react to information asymmetry as the
number of agents becomes large. Consequently, price-taking behavior may be significantly
affected and this can influence the efficiency of the market, measured by social welfare in the
equilibrium outcome.
Basing on these intuitions, I state and demonstrate three claims:
First, the way information precision decreases with increased number of agents can play
an important role in the limiting price-taking behavior as the number of agents increases. If
the rate of decline of individual information precision is slow, agents react to their signals with
a certain strength. Therefore, a certain variation in the market quantity is expected, and the
effect of adverse selection is not strong enough to undo the effect of increased competition.
Consequently, in the limit, price taking can be achieved. On the other hand, if individual
information precision of the agents declines rapidly as the number of agents grows, they will
not react to their signals strongly and the aggregate variation in the market quantity will
be low. Consequently, a deviation from the expected quantities would indicate a relatively
strong signal received by an agent, which in turn indicates a large shock on the demand or
the unit cost. Thus, prices can become very sensitive to quantities traded in the market,
i.e., the price impact of quantities traded grows. Therefore the adverse selection effect can
become strong enough to withstand the competitive pressure as the number of agents grows
and in the limit no agent may become a price-taker.
2This can be demonstrated with an approximate argument. In this paper, I do not get into the details of
information acquisition and how a certain rate of decrease in individual information precision is achieved. I
just start with a given rate and explore the implications. Incorporating the details of information acquisition
and the construction of the particular acquisition function, although being interesting, require substantial
effort and analysis that does not ultimately add to the insights I aim to present in this paper and increase the
length of the paper substantially.
3
Second, whether the agents become price-takers or not depends on the side of the market
on which the number of agents gets large. Specifically, having a large number of sellers and
small number of buyers may make all agents price-takers in the limit, but having a small
number of sellers and large number of buyers may cause non-price-taking behavior for all
agents. The reason for this is the inherent dependence of the buyers’ payoffs: in an industrial
market where the buyers are competing in the same downstream market, the buyers’ payoffs
are dependent on the quantities that their competitors buy. In particular, with Cournot style
competition, each buyer’s desired quantity will be approximately inversely proportional to
the number of competitors she has. This inverse proportionality gets multiplied with a scale
factor that is negatively correlated with the price of the intermediate good to determine the
total quantity. Therefore, the price schedule of each buyer is decreasing in the price of the
intermediate good, and the coefficient is in the order of 1/N . Aggregating over all N agents,
one can see that the sensitivity of the inverse demand schedule to quantity can have a positive
lower bound. Therefore, because of the interdependence of their payoffs, making the number
of buyers large does not necessarily result in price-taking behavior in the limit.
Third, contrary to common perception, increasing the number of agents in the market can,
in fact, move the participants arbitrarily away from price-taking and cause large inefficiencies
in the market even as the number of agents on both sides of the market gets large. This
claim is markedly different from the first claim, but the intuition starts from the same point:
As explained above for the first claim, when the rate of decrease of individual information
precision is high as the number of agents increases, the adverse selection effect can become
strong and withstand the competitive pressure to keep the agents from being price-takers. If
the rate is above a certain point, the information effect may become too strong as the number
of agents gets large and consequently the price impact of the quantities in the market can
go to infinity as the number of agents increases. As a result, the trade and consequently
production can significantly decrease causing large inefficiencies. In fact, this effect can be so
severe that the production can fully dry up as the number of agents in the market gets very
large.
Demand curve equilibrium with private information and common values was first exam-
ined by Wilson (1979) in the context of divisible good auctions. In his model, a number
of bidders submit demand schedules, and the clearing price is determined by equating the
total demand to the fixed number of shares of a good supplied by a seller. Vives (1986)
and Klemperer and Meyer (1989) also examine demand curve equilibria in the context of a
production oligopoly. Private information, however, is not a part of these models. On the
other hand, private information can play a very important role in market outcome. Vives
(2002), shows that in a Cournot market, the impact of private information can dominate the
impact of market power in determining the behavior of convergence to efficiency. Kyle (1989)
analyzes demand curve equilibrium in a financial market setting under private information.
Utilizing the normality of value distributions, he derives equilibria in linear demand curves.
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The main idea behind the solution is that analyzing each realization of her residual sup-
ply curve conditionally, each agent can utilize the other agents’ information reflected in the
market outcome. Mendelson and Tunca (2004a) utilize demand curve equilibrium to analyze
liquidity in an industrial exchange with a monopolistic seller and examine the implications on
forward contracting. Tunca (2004) uses demand curve equilibrium with private information
to analyze the performance of a market where a single large buyer faces an oligopolistic set of
sellers for procurement purposes. Technically, our approach in this paper is similar to Kyle
(1989): Making the quantity decision conditional on the realization of the residual demand
and supply curves leads to the construction of the ex-ante demand curves from ex-post opti-
mal price-quantity pairs and hence (also as in Klemperer and Meyer 1989), the equilibrium
curves are ex-post optimal as well as being ex-ante optimal. Note that demand curve equilib-
ria are indeed implemented today in many markets for procurement, especially for energy. In
wholesale electricity markets that operate in many countries, buyers and sellers are required
to submit a sequence of price-quantity pairs which form their demand and supply curves and
which are aggregated and intersected to reach a market clearing price (see Wilson 2002).
Our market clearing system can also be viewed as a multi-unit (more precisely divisible
good) auction and can be implemented as such, i.e., the equilibrium can be implemented
through a centralized auction in which a neutral auctioneer collects demand and supply
curves from buyers and sellers, aggregates them and sets the market clearing price at the
value that equates excess supply (or demand) to zero. From this point of view, our rate of
convergence to efficiency results are related to the rate of convergence results in the double
auction literature which mostly considers agents having private values and 0 − 1 demands
(see e.g., Gresik and Satterthwaite 1989, Satterthwaite and Williams 1989 and Rustichini
et al. 1994). Vayanos (1999), utilizing the Kyle (1989) framework, considers the more
realistic case of multi-unit demands in a dynamic setting and a financial market context.
In his model, agents’ private information is about individual endowments in contrast to the
previous literature in which the private information is about personal valuations. Our model
in this paper can be considered to extend on these by letting the agents have multi-unit
demands, common values, correlated signals and interdependent utilities, albeit, in a stylized
industrial market framework. Comparing our results on rate to efficiency studied in this
literature, there are two noteworthy distinctions: First, in our model, the rates of convergence
to price taking and efficiency (when there is convergence) are dependent on the rate at which
the precision of information changes. Specifically, increasing the rate at which information
precision decreases, decreases the rate of convergence. Second, the rate of convergence to
efficiency is slower than that given in the double auction literature, that typically finds the
convergence rate proportional to M−2 (cf., Rustichini et al. 1994).3 Further, depending
on the rate at which information precision decreases with increased number of agents, this
convergence can be arbitrarily slow. So our results also demonstrate that such markets that
3Note that the specifics of the social efficiency measure differs naturally because of the differences in the
setups.
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involve multi-unit demands, common values and correlated signals can converge to efficiency
much slower than markets that do not have these features.
This paper is also related to the literature that explores strategic justification for price-
taking behavior in large exchange economies (see, e.g., Roberts and Postlewaite 1976, Otani
and Sicilian, 1982, 1990, Jackson 1992, Jackson and Manelli 1997, and Bonnisseau and Florig
2003). This branch of literature is mainly concerned about finding regularity conditions to
guarantee the convergence of strategic equilibria of a sequence of economies to the competitive
limit. Our model differs from this literature by examining an economy that has production
(rather than pure exchange), and agents’ having information asymmetry with correlated
signals on underlying uncertainties on which the agents have common values. From this
angle, however, we can say that the example family of economies that we give showing that
decreasing information precision can cause full inefficiency with a large number of agents,
suggests that for these types of extensions, the convergence of strategic equilibria to efficient
outcomes is not immediate and requires more attention.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and gives
the equilibrium outcome. Section 3 introduces the specifics of information precision decrease
rate with increased number of agents, explores its role on price-taking and efficiency, and
demonstrates the results supporting our claims about the price-taking behavior. Section 4
offers the concluding remarks. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
There are N(≥ 2) manufacturers (buyers) and M(≥ 2) suppliers (sellers) in the industry.4
The suppliers provide an intermediate good to the manufacturers’ production process. The
manufacturers use the intermediate good as a (one-to-one) input and compete in the consumer
market with the final product as Cournot oligopolists. All suppliers’ products are identical
and perfectly substitutable as an input for all the manufacturers.
The manufacturers face the demand curve pd = K + d−
∑N
i=1 qi in the consumer market
where pd is the price in the consumer market, qi is the quantity produced by the manufacturer
i, 1≤ i≤N , and d is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2d. The unit production
costs are given as c0 + h where h is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2h. The
random variables d and h are independent.
Before trading and subsequent production, the manufacturers have private signals about
the state of the demand, d. Specifically, manufacturer i, 1≤ i≤N , has a signal, sdi = d+ εi
about d where εi are i.i.d. normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2ε . The suppliers’
4Throughout the paper I use the terms “manufacturer” and “buyer” interchangeably. Similarly the terms
“supplier” and “seller” are used interchangeably.
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unit marginal cost is uncertain, but each supplier has a noisy signal about its realization. For
1≤ j≤M , supplier j has the signal scj = h+ uj where uj are i.i.d. normally distributed with
mean 0 and variance σ2u. The noise terms, {εi} and {uj} are independent of h, d and each
other. For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, I normalize the manufacturers’
production costs to zero. Also for notational convenience, define the parameter vector v =
(σ2d, σ
2
h, σ
2
ε , σ
2
u,K, c0).
Let yj be the quantity sold by supplier j, j = 1, . . . ,M , qi be the quantity bought (and
produced) by the manufacturer i, i = 1, . . . , N , and pe be the market clearing price for
the intermediate good. Then, denoting the payoffs for the manufacturer and the suppliers,
respectively, by (the random variables) Πmi for i = 1, ... , N , and Πsj for j = 1, ... , M , we
have
Πmi = qi(K + d−
N∑
k=1
qk − pe) (1)
and
Πsj = yj(pe − (c0 + h)) , (2)
for i = 1, ... , N and j = 1, ... , M . Denote the total manufacturer surplus by Πm and total
supplier surplus by Πs, i.e., Πm =
∑N
i=1Πmi and Πs =
∑M
j=1Πsj . Finally, denote the total
quantity produced by TQ =
∑N
i=1 qi and the consumer surplus (TQ(K+d−pd)/2 = TQ2/2)
by Πc.
2.1 Equilibrium Conditions
We study the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this market. The strategies of the traders are
demand and supply curves that they submit: Each supplier submits a supply curve indicating
the quantity she is willing to sell at each price, and each manufacturer submits a demand
curve indicating the quantity she is willing to buy at each price. The market clears at the
price that equates the demand and the aggregate supply.
Since the participants have private information, their strategy curves are functions of
their signals in addition to price. Denote the equilibrium demand schedule for supplier j,
j = 1, . . . ,M , by Yj : IR2 → IR. That is, if supplier j gets signal scj , he will submit the supply
curve Yj(scj ; ·), which will indicate that at price p, she will supply Yj(h; p) units in equilibrium.
Similarly, the equilibrium demand schedule for manufacturer i is Qi : IR2→IR. That is, given
her signal sdi , manufacturer i submits the demand curve Qi(s
d
i ; ·), where Qi(sdi ; p) is the
amount she demands at price p. Denote the vector of equilibrium supply curves for the
suppliers by Y, and for each supplier j, denote the vector of equilibrium supply curves of
the remaining suppliers by Y−j . Similarly, denote the vector of equilibrium demand curves
for the manufacturers by Q, and for each manufacturer i, denote the equilibrium demand
curves for the remaining manufacturers by Q−i. Denote the equilibrium price by pe(Y, Q), the
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equilibrium quantity that manufacturer i ends up purchasing by qi(Y, Q), and the equilibrium
quantity that supplier j ends up selling by yj(Y, Q) (all random variables). Also define the
residual demand curve facing supplier j as the inverse of
∑N
i=1Qi(s
d
i ; p) −
∑
k 6=j Yk(sck; p) ,
and the residual supply curve facing the manufacturer as the inverse of
∑M
j=1 Yj(scj ; p) −∑
k 6=iQi(s
d
k; p) (both with respect to p).
The market clearing price, pe, will be determined by solving
N∑
i=1
Qi(sdi ; pe)−
M∑
i=1
Yj(scj ; pe) = 0, (3)
and the allocations will be
qi(Y, Q) = Qi(sdi ; pe) and yj(Y, Q) = Yj(scj ; pe) . (4)
Finally, for a manufacturer i, define q−i as the vector of quantities produced by the remaining
manufacturers.
Given the above definitions, an equilibrium has to satisfy the following properties:
(i) Given her signal, the trading strategies of the remaining manufacturers and those of
the suppliers, each manufacturer’s strategy maximizes her expected profit. That is, for
each i, 1≤ i≤N and any alternative demand schedule Q′,
E[Πm(qi(Y, Qi, Q−i), q−i(Y, Qi, Q−i), pe(Y, Qi, Q−i))|sdi ]
≥E[Πm(qi(Y, Q′i, Q−i), q−i(Y, Q′i, Q−i), pe(Y, Q′i, Q−i))|sdi ] . (5)
(ii) Given her signal and the other suppliers’ and the manufacturer’s strategies, each sup-
plier maximizes her expected profit. That is, for any alternative supply schedule Y ′
E[Πs(yj(Y,Y−j , Q), pe(Y,Y−j , Q))|scj ]≥E[Πs(yj(Y ′,Y−j , Q), pe(Y ′,Y−j , Q))|scj ] . (6)
Taking advantage of the additive demand structure with normal distributions (hence the
fact that the sum of the competitors’ signals is a sufficient statistic for the unit marginal
cost), an agent’s optimization problem can be solved by conditioning on the realization of
the residual supply or residual demand and finding the optimum quantity-price pair for each
realization. The resulting optimal curve passes through all ex-post optimal price-quantity
pairs.5 This means that agents choose their price-quantity pairs by conditioning on each
realization that they may be facing and optimizing point-wise for that realization. As a result,
each realization of the residual supply curve will be associated with an optimal quantity and
5For more details, see Kyle (1989, pp. 325-332) who first presented a financial market equilibrium solution
utilizing this approach.
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the price corresponding to that quantity on that curve. The optimal ex-ante demand and
supply curves submitted by the agents are constructed by tracing all these pairs, which are ex-
post optimal. It follows that the agents will, in effect, be utilizing the information contained
in the realization of the residual supply curve without actually observing that realization.6
Our analysis focuses on symmetric linear equilibria where Qi has the form
Qi(sdi ; p) = α0i + αss
d
i + αpp, (7)
and Yj has the form
Yj(scj ; p) = β0i + βsscj + βpp, (8)
with αs, αp, being the same for all i and βs and βp being the same for all j.7
Note that linearity is not a constraint here. In equilibrium, given all other players’ strate-
gies, each player endogenously chooses to play a linear strategy. So the strategy space for
the players are not restricted to linear curves in the equilibrium we find. Symmetry on αs,
αp, βs and βp however, is a constraint for our solution and will be necessary for tractability.
One issue here is that “zero-trading” (i.e., Qi = 0 and Yj = 0, for all i, j) is always a
trivial symmetric linear equilibrium which is obviously not very interesting. So we would
like to have Qi 6=0 and Yj 6=0 and we will distinguish such equilibria as trading equilibria.
Further, we will call an equilibrium regular if the individual demand curves slope down and
the individual supply curves slope up. With the linear strategies defined as in (7) and (8),
this will correspond to equilibria in which αp < 0 and βp > 0 and we will focus on those
equilibria.
To summarize, we will be exploring equilibria that satisfy all these conditions, i.e., we
will be looking for Regular Linear Symmetric Trading (Bayesian Nash) Equilibria, which we
will shortly denote as RLSTE.
2.2 A Measure of Price Taking
An important characteristic of the market and a measure of how close the agents are to being
price-takers is the price impact of trades or the slope of the residual supply (or demand)
curve: Each unit traded drives the market price against a trader, whether she is a buyer or
a seller, and the price impact is the marginal price response to this trade. The smaller the
market impact of her trades, the closer a participant is to being a price-taker.8
6Details on this are given in the proof of Proposition 1.
7Imposing symmetry on the constant coefficients α0 and β0 is not necessary and hence we left them free here.
In Proposition 1, we show that in the kind of equilibrium we are looking for, symmetry in these coefficients
emerge endogenously. That is, α0i turn out to be equal for all i and β0j turn out to be equal for all j.
8The price impact of trades is also frequently used as a measure of market illiquidity in the finance literature
(see, e.g., Kyle 1985, O’Hara 1997, Mendelson and Tunca 2004b).
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In a linear symmetric trading equilibrium, for manufacturer i’s quantity sold qi and the
corresponding price p, (3) and (4) imply
∑
k 6=i
α0k + αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk + (N − 1)αpp+ qˆi =
M∑
j=1
β0j + βs
M∑
j=1
scj +Mβpp, (9)
so manufacturer i’s, residual supply curve satisfies
p = λ0 + λ1qi (10)
where
λ0,
∑
k 6=i α0k + αs
∑
k 6=i s
d
k −
∑M
j=1 β0j + βs
∑M
j=1 s
c
j
Mβp − (N − 1)αp and λ1,
1
Mβp − (N − 1)αp .
(11)
That is, when a manufacturer tries to buy one additional unit, she drives the price up by
the manufacturers’ price impact coefficient λ1. Similarly, for a given supplier j, 1≤ j≤M ,
realization of her residual demand curve, and her sold quantity yj
(M − 1)β0 + βs
∑
k 6=j
sck − (M − 1)βpp+ yj =
N∑
i=1
α0i + αs
N∑
i=1
sdk +Nαpp , (12)
and hence, the residual demand curve facing supplier j satisfies
p = Λ0 + Λ1yj (13)
where
Λ0,
(M − 1)β0 + βs
∑
k 6=j s
c
k −
∑N
i=1 α0i − αs
∑N
i=1 s
d
i
Nαp − (M − 1)βp and Λ1,
1
Nαp − (M − 1)βp .
(14)
Parallel to λ1, suppliers’ price impact coefficient Λ1 represents the market impact of the
suppliers’ orders: For a given realization of her residual demand curve, an additional unit
that a supplier decides to sell decreases the transaction price by −Λ1 dollars.
Note that λ1 > 0 and Λ1 < 0, meaning that for any realization, every unit demanded by
the manufacturer increases the clearing price (by λ1), and every unit supplied by a supplier
decreases the market clearing price (by Λ1). Therefore, the absolute value of the correspond-
ing market impact coefficient for each type of trader indicates how difficult it is for that type
of trader to trade in this market. For instance, λ1 being close to 0 would mean that the man-
ufacturers are almost price-takers. On the other hand, λ1→∞ means that the participants,
are very far away from being price-takers and the trading costs are very large in the market
prohibiting each trader from making large trades. Therefore, in this sense, magnitudes of λ1
and Λ1 measure the degree of the buyers’ and the sellers’ price-taking behavior respectively.
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2.3 Bayesian Updates and the Equilibrium
By observing her cost signal and conditional on the realization of her residual demand curve,
each supplier can infer the realization of the marginal cost, i.e., h. By (12), the informa-
tion obtained conditional on the realization of the residual supply curve is equivalent to that
obtained from the observation of (βs
∑
k 6=j s
c
k − αs
∑N
i=1 s
d
i ). From the normality of the dis-
tributions, for a given supplier j, 1≤ j≤M , we then can write the corresponding conditional
expectation by the regression equation
E[h|Λ0, scj ] = ν1scj + ν2(βs
∑
k 6=j
sck − αs
N∑
i=1
sdi ) , (15)
where ν1 and ν2 are as given in Appendix A, equations (A.3) and (A.4).9
Similarly, observing her signal and conditional on the realization of her residual supply
curve, manufacturer i can make an inference about the state of the demand, d, and about the
aggregate quantity bought and produced by all other manufacturers, which is identified by
αs
∑
k 6=i s
d
k (since the remaining terms in
∑
k 6=iQk are deterministic for a given p). By (9), the
information obtained about competitors’ actions conditional on a realization of her residual
supply curve is equivalent to the information conditional on a realization of αs
∑
k 6=i s
d
k −∑M
j=1 βss
c
j . It again follows that in a linear symmetric trading equilibrium, we can write the
corresponding conditional expectations using the regression equations:
E[d|sdi , αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk −
M∑
j=1
βss
c
j ] = η1s
d
i + η2(αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk −
M∑
j=1
βss
c
j) , (16)
and
E[αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk|sdi , αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk −
M∑
j=1
βss
c
j ] = ρ1s
d
i + ρ2(αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk −
M∑
j=1
βss
c
j) , (17)
where, η1, η2, ρ1 and ρ2 are given in Appendix A, (A.1), (A.2), (A.5) and (A.6).
As can be seen from (15), each supplier has two pieces of information to use when deciding
her quantity, namely signal and the realization of her residual demand curve. The coefficients
ν1 and ν2 determine the relative weight that each supplier puts on those two sources when
determining the optimal quantity to choose. Particularly, a high βs
∑
k 6=j s
c
k − αs
∑N
i=1 s
d
i
referred from the market outcome, signals a high realization of the marginal cost and a low
value referred signals the opposite. Notice that the accuracy of these two information sources
are related and determined by the “noisiness” of the suppliers’ signals, i.e., the relative mag-
nitudes of σ2u and σ
2
h. If σ
2
u is small relative to σ
2
h, then the suppliers’ signals are relatively
9Detailed derivations for these coefficients (as well as the corresponding ones for the manufacturers) are
given in the proof of Proposition 1.
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accurate and ν1 is high. This gets reflected on βs, i.e., in such a case, the suppliers’ quanti-
ties sold are strongly related to their signals and βs is high. Aggregated over all competitors’
trades, this relation gets reflected to residual demand curve that a supplier is facing, or equiv-
alently βs
∑
k 6=j s
c
k−αs
∑N
i=1 s
d
i . That is, when suppliers’ signals are informative, the residual
supply curve each one of them faces will be more informative as well and the opposite will
be true when their signals are not very accurate. This naturally affects the way the suppliers
react to the realization of the residual demand. The coefficient ν2, which determines how
sensitive they are towards unexpected quantity movements in the market adjusts accordingly
determining how large 1/βp is, which, in turn, determines how close the participants are to
being price-takers.
This fundamental intuition will form the foundation of our arguments for the main results
in the paper and based on that, the specific way information precision decreases as the number
of agents increases plays a key role in determining the price-taking behavior in the limit. We
will discuss these effects further in Section 3 when we get into the analysis of how the way
information precision decreases with increased number of agents specifically determines the
asymptotic market behavior.
We will now proceed to the solution for the equilibrium. The following proposition sum-
marizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium for a given set of parameters.
Proposition 1
LetM , N and a parameter vector v be given and let a(r), b(r), c(r), d(r), e(r), f(r), g(r) and
h(r) be as defined in Appendix A. A coefficient vector ((α01, . . . , α0N ), (β01, . . . , β0M ), αs, βs, αp, βp)
constitutes the coefficients of a regular linear symmetric trading equilibrium strategy profile
{Q,Y} as given in (7) and (8) if and only if
(a) There exists a root r∈ IR, of the following polynomial equation
(a(r)− c(r)− e(r))(h(r)(b(r)− (N − 1))− d(r))
(2− d(r) + b(r) + (N − 1)h(r))(a(r)h(r) + e(r)− c(r)) = 1 (18)
on the region
rl, −
√
M(M − 1)σ2u
(M − 2)N(Nσ2d + σ2ε)
< r < −
√
(M − 1)σ2u
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)
, rh , (19)
that satisfies
a(r)− c(r)− e(r) > 0 . (20)
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(b) For a root r∈ IR that satisfies the conditions in (a),
αs =
a(r)− c(r)− e(r)
2− d(r) + b(r) + (N − 1)h(r) , (21)
βs = αs/r , (22)
αp =
((M − 1)g(r) + 1)βs
Nf(r)
, (23)
βp =
g(r)βs
f(r)
. (24)
Moreover,
Λ1 = f(r)/βs and λ1 = e(r)/αs, (25)
and the constant coefficients satisfy
α0i =
K(Mν2 + Λ1) +Mc0(η2 − ρ2)
(Mν2 + Λ1)(N + 1 + λ1((N − 1)αp + 1)) +NΛ1(η2 − ρ2) ,α0, 1≤ i≤N, (26)
and
β0j =
Nα0ν2 + c0
Λ1 +Mν2
,β0 , 1≤ j≤M, (27)
where η2 and ρ2 are as given in Appendix A.
This result will be the basis of our analysis and we will use it extensively when we derive our
main conclusions in the next section.
3 Information Precision and Efficiency
We now consider the effect of division of information among the agents on market competi-
tiveness as the number of agents becomes large. As the number of buyers or sellers increases,
one would expect that the incentives to acquire information would decrease, and consequently
the quality of information each agent has would decrease. To quantify this, I modify and
extend the notion of information precision introduced in Kyle (1989). Formally, for a given
signal (or collection of signals) S on an underlying information variable v, define the precision
of S as
τv(S) =
1
V ar[v|S] . (28)
Notice that, by the signal structure given in Section 2 and the normality assumptions, we
have
τd(sdi ) =
σ2d + σ
2
ε
σ2dσ
2
ε
and τh(scj) =
σ2h + σ
2
u
σ2hσ
2
u
. (29)
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Further, the precision of the total information in the market for d and h will be
τd({sd1, . . . , sdN}) =
1
σ2d
+
N
σ2ε
and τh({sc1, . . . , scM}) =
1
σ2h
+
M
σ2u
, (30)
respectively.
The question then becomes how individual signal precisions change with an increased
number of sellers and buyers. Since the increased number of traders reduces incentives to
acquire information by reducing the relative market power and hence the relative expected
benefits of having information, the precision in each signal should decrease. This means
increased noise in each trader’s signal as the number of traders increases. When considering
the change in precision of information as the number of agents increases, Kyle (1989) examines
the special case where the total amount of private information in the market, stays constant
and is divided equally among the participants. This implies that the individual noise variance
in each signal is proportional to the number of agents that have a signal about the underlying
variable (cf. Kyle 1989, p. 339).
I extend this notion by generalizing the way the total amount of information precision
decreases with an increased number of agents in the market. Let
σ2ε(N) = ϕm(N)σ
2
εo and σ
2
u(M) = ϕs(M)σ
2
uo , (31)
where ϕm, ϕs : IN+→IR+ with
lim
N→∞
ϕm(N)6=0 , (32)
and
lim
M→∞
ϕs(M)6=0 . (33)
Define
γm = inf{γ : lim
N→∞
ϕm(N)
Nγ
<∞, γ≥ 0} . (34)
That is, for instance, if ϕm(N) = N , then the precision of signals scale proportionally as
the number of manufacturers increases and γm = 1. Alternatively, if ϕm(N) = 1, then the
signal precision of the individual manufacturers does not change as their number increases
and γm = 0.
Similarly, define
γs = inf{γ : lim
M→∞
ϕs(M)
Mγ
<∞, γ≥ 0} . (35)
Given this information structure, I will examine the conjecture of price taking for three
main cases. In Case I, the number of sellers will get large while the number of buyers will
stay fixed. In Case II, the number of sellers will be fixed while the number of buyers will get
large. Finally, in Case III, the number of buyers and sellers will both get large. For each
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case, I will examine three subcases of information division: The cases of the total information
about the relevant uncertainty in the economy increasing (0≤ γs < 1 and/or 0≤ γm < 1);
staying the same (γs = 1 and/or γm = 1); and decreasing (γs > 1 and/or γm > 1) as the
number of agents gets large.
3.1 Case I: Fixed number of Buyers as the Number of Sellers gets Large
I start by examining the case when the number of buyers is fixed and the number of sellers
gets large. That is, I will be examining the equilibria in a sequence of economies when N is
fixed and as M→∞. For this case, by our construction, the amount of demand information
in the economy will remain constant while the total precision of cost information will change
with the number of suppliers, M , in one of the three ways described above. The following
proposition presents the results for all three subcases:
Proposition 2 For a given v,
(i) If 0 ≤ γs < 1, then there exists an M∈IN such that if M > M , there exists a unique
RLSTE for the economy. For any such sequence of equilibria asM→∞, limM→∞ λ1 = 0
and limM→∞ Λ1 = 0. That is, all participants in the market become price-takers in the
limit. Further, limM→∞ λ1·M
γs−1
2 and limM→∞−Λ1·M
γs−1
2 are positive constants, i.e.,
the agents become price-takers at a rate M
γs−1
2 .
(ii) If γs = 1 and σ2uo/σ
2
h is sufficiently small, then there exists an M∈IN such that if
M > M there exists a RLSTE. For any such sequence of equilibria as M→∞, there
exist λ∗ > 0 and Λ∗ < 0 such that limM→∞ λ1 = λ∗ and limM→∞ Λ1 = Λ∗, i.e., no
participant becomes a price-taker in the limit.
(iii) If γs > 1, then there exists an M∈IN such that if M > M an RLSTE does not exist.
Part (i) of Proposition 2 states that when the amount of information in the economy
increases with the number of sellers, the conjecture of price-taking is supported in equilibrium.
This is because, when 0≤γs < 1, as the number of suppliers gets large, the signals of the
sellers are still informative beyond a threshold and they react to their signals with a certain
strength (i.e., βs converges to zero slowly). Aggregated over a large number of agents, this
effect results in a certain variation in the market outcome being expected by the agents.
Therefore, increasing the quantity traded has a limited signal value for the realization of
costs and consequently a limited impact on the clearing price. As a result, in this case, the
pressure from increased number of agents takes over. This manifests itself in the sum of the
slopes of the supply curves submitted by the sellers and pushes towards price-taking, making
the agents price-takers in the limit.
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However, when the total amount of information stays the same, (i.e., when γs = 1), the
price-taking conjecture fails. As stated in part (ii), increasing the number of sellers does
not lead to price-taking. The reason for this is that as the number of sellers increases, this
time each unexpected unit has a sizeable informational effect pushing the sellers away from
becoming price-takers, and this effect is comparable to the effect of the increased number of
sellers that pushes the sellers towards price-taking. As a result, the two effects balance each
other in the limit, and no agent becomes a price-taker asymptotically.
Finally, part (iii) says that when the total precision of information in the market is
decreasing with the number of sellers and when the number of sellers is beyond a certain
threshold, a regular linear symmetric trading equilibrium does not exist. This is because, as
the number of sellers increases in this case, the prices become very sensitive to the quantities
traded, and beyond a certain point, an equilibrium of the type we are looking for ceases to
exist. This does not mean, however, that no other equilibrium exists. This only means that
the specific type of equilibrium we are looking for is silent for these market specifications.
We will discuss this inexistence issue further in Section 3.3, where we will also obtain insights
into what the equilibrium outcome might look like for such regions based on examples where
a RLSTE exists in the limit as the number of agents becomes large.
Note that as given in part (i), as the number of sellers increases, the agents become
price-takers at a rate M
γs−1
2 , and the convergence can be arbitrarily small as γs→1. That is
reducing the relative informativeness of the signals of the agents slows down the convergence
to efficiency. We discuss this issue further in Section 3.3.
The contrast between parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 also confirms our first claim:
Whether the agents become price-takers or not depends on the specific way the information
precision decreases as the number of agents gets large. Notice that when the number of sellers
increases, agents from both sides become price-takers.
The results from this case will further provide us with a contrast point to the mirror-image
case where the number of suppliers is fixed and the number of buyers gets large. We will see
that the conjecture of price-taking is sensitive to which side of the market (buyer or seller
side) has a large number of agents.
3.2 Case II: Fixed number of Sellers as the Number of Buyers gets Large
We now examine the case when M is fixed and N gets large. The following proposition
presents the outcome:
Proposition 3
(i) If 0≤ γm≤ 1 and σ2d is sufficiently large, then there exists N ∈ IN such that when
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N > N , there exists a unique RLSTE. For any such sequence of equilibria as N→∞,
there exist λ∗ > 0 and Λ∗ < 0 such that limN→∞ λ1 = λ∗ and limN→∞ Λ1 = Λ∗. That
is, as the number of buyers gets large, the participants do not become price-takers.
(ii) If γm > 1, then there exists an N > 0 such that if N > N > 0 a RLSTE does not exist.
As can be seen from part (i) of Proposition 3, when the number of sellers is fixed and the
number of buyers becomes large, even when the total amount of information in the market
increases with increased number of buyers (i.e., when 0≤ γm < 1), the participants do not
become price-takers. This result is in contrast to the corresponding case with fixed number
of buyers and number of sellers going to infinity, given in part (i) of Proposition 2, in Section
3.1. The reason why we observe such a difference here is that each buyer has a share in the
order of N−1 in the consumer market, and each one’s optimal quantity as a function of pe is
linear with a coefficient approximately proportional to −1/N as N gets large. As a result,
the rate of change of the optimal total quantity for the manufacturers with the price of the
intermediate good will asymptotically be a constant. Consequently, the participants will not
be price-takers in the limit.
When the total precision of information is increasing with the number of buyers, i.e.,
when γ > 1, similar to the case stated in part (iii) of Proposition 2, the particular kind of
equilibrium we are looking for is again silent. Again, this issue is discussed further in Section
3.3.
The contrast between part (i) of Proposition 2 and part (i) of Proposition 3 confirms our
second claim that limiting price-taking behavior may depend on the side of the market, on
which the number of participants becomes large. Notice that the interdependence of payoffs
of the oligopolist manufacturers was crucial for this result. This suggests that in industrial
markets with downstream competition that makes the buyers’ payoffs naturally dependent on
each other, having a large number of buyers does not necessarily imply that the participants
will be price-takers. Finally, this also suggests that in order to have limiting price-taking
behavior in such a market, the number of sellers may have to get large. In the next section,
we examine the case with large numbers of buyers and sellers and explore the effects of
increasing the number of agents on both sides of the market.
3.3 Case III: Both the Number of Sellers and the Number of Buyers get
Large
Finally, we examine the case where the number of agents on both sides of the market get
large. For brevity, we will focus on the case where the precision of information changes at
the same rate in the limit for both the buyers and the sellers, and define γo, γm = γs. We
will also take the limit for M and N when they lie on any given ray in the interior of IR2+.
17
This will allow us to demonstrate the necessary results for our purposes while keeping the
analysis concise.
The following proposition presents the outcome:
Proposition 4 Let v be given and consider any path in IN2+ where limN,M→∞
N
M = k for
some k > 0. Then,
(i) If 0 ≤ γo < 1, then there exist N , M ∈ IN such that ifM > M , there exists a unique RL-
STE for the economy. For any such sequence of equilibria as M→∞, limN,M→∞ λ1 = 0
and limN,M→∞ Λ1 = 0. That is, all participants in the market become price-takers in the
limit. Further, limN,M→∞ λ1·M
γo−1
2 and limN,M→∞−Λ1·M
γo−1
2 are positive constants,
i.e., the agents become price-takers at a rate M
γo−1
2 .
(ii) If γs = 1 and σ2uo/σ
2
h is sufficiently small, then there exists an M∈IN such that if
M > M , there exists a RLSTE. For any such sequence of equilibria as N,M→∞, there
exist λ∗ > 0 and Λ∗ < 0 such that limM→∞ λ1 = λ∗ and limM→∞ Λ1 = Λ∗, i.e., no
participant becomes a price-taker in the limit.
(iii) When γo > 1 then
(a) If
σ2d
σ2h
=
√
σ2εo
σ2uo
kγ−1, (36)
and σ2uo/σ
2
h is sufficiently small, then there exists an M∈IN such that if M > M ,
there exists a RLSTE. For any such sequence of equilibria, as N,M→∞,
limN,M→∞ λ1 = limN,M→∞−Λ1 =∞.
(b) Otherwise, there exists an M∈IN such that if M > M , a RLSTE does not exist.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 4 further demonstrate the sensitivity of the price-taking
conjecture to the particular way the information precision decreases as the number of agents
increases: As it was for the case with large number of sellers and fixed number of buyers, when
the market becomes more informative with the addition of new agents, the agents become
price-takers in the limit; however, when the total information in the market stays constant
with the increased number of agents, the price-taking conjecture does not survive.
Part (iii)(a) of Proposition 4 confirms our third claim: When the total amount of in-
formation decreases with the increased number of agents, increasing the number of agents
in the market can move the traders away from price taking. In fact, this part tells us that
there exist sequences of economies where, as the number of agents in the market increases,
the opposite extreme of price-taking happens in equilibrium, and the price impact of each
18
unit traded in the market goes to infinity. This is noteworthy, and we will see shortly how
this effect can cause significant inefficiencies in the market.
Part (iii)(b) of Proposition 4 says that when the parameters do not satisfy condition (36),
a linear, symmetric trading equilibrium does not exist when the number of agents in the
market goes beyond a certain point. Part (iii)(a) provides some insights for this: When the
total precision of information in the market decreases with the number of agents, the agents
start reacting strongly to unexpected quantities in the market, and the price becomes too
sensitive to the quantity, making it very costly to trade in the limit. Unless a certain balance
among the informational parameters is satisfied (i.e., equation (36)), there can be no regular
linear symmetric trading equilibrium (note that zero-trading is always a trivial equilibrium).
Once again, this is more a statement about the limitations of the specific class of equilibria
(namely linear symmetric trading equilibria) that we are examining. Unfortunately, outside
of the class of linear symmetric equilibria, we lose tractability. But it should be kept in mind
that there may be other trading equilibria outside of this class as N,M→∞. The family of
cases specified in part (iii)(a) of Proposition 4, besides providing a class of examples in which
increasing the number of agents in the market can lead to non-price taking behavior (and in
which the market performance may suffer as we shall see), may also provide some insights of
the characteristics of the non-linear equilibria in that region.
The effect of the failure of price taking in the market requires further attention. In
particular, the effect can be severe for the case when λ1→∞ and Λ1→−∞, i.e., for γo > 1.
The following proposition presents the results on this:
Proposition 5 Maintaining the existence of a sequence of RLSTE as M,N→∞
and limM,N→∞N/M = k,
(i) If γo < 2, then E[pe]→c0 and E[TQ]→K − c0 as N,M→∞.
(ii) If γo = 2, then for any k > 0 and p satisfying c0 < p < (kK + c0)/(k + 1), one
can find (σ2d, σ
2
h, σ
2
uo, σ
2
εo) ∈ IR4+, such that E[pe]→p, as N,M→∞. When E[pe]→p,
E[TQ]→K − p − 1k (p − c0). Particularly, as p→c0, E[TQ]→K − c0 and as p→(kK +
c0)/(k + 1), E[TQ]→0.
(iii) If γo > 2, then E[pe]→(kK + c0)/(k + 1) and E[TQ]→0 as N,M→∞.
Part (i) of Proposition 5 tells that when the total information in the market increases or
stays the same with the increased number of agents, the market is efficient. Further, it says
that even when the total information decreases with the number of sellers in the market at
a slow rate, the efficiency is preserved, although the participants move arbitrarily away from
price-taking (i.e., even though λ1→∞ and Λ1→−∞). Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 5
are noteworthy: When the total information in the market decreases sufficiently fast with
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increased number of sellers (i.e., when γo≥2), the increase in the price impact of the trades
in the market can affect the market performance dramatically. Notice that in the limiting
economy with no information, the only equilibrium that can be supported under price-taking
is one that has pe = c0 and TQ = K − c0. However, Proposition 5 demonstrates that
not only the price-taking conjecture can fail for markets with private information, but also
assuming price-taking behavior can lead to gross errors in predicting market performance
and the allocation of surplus.
So how is the rate of convergence to efficiency affected by the rate at which information
precision decreases? To see this, we examine the rate of convergence to efficiency for the
cases in which the equilibrium outcome does converge to efficiency, i.e., for γo < 2. But first,
we define the notion of efficiency loss in our context. For this, consider the first-best social
optimum, in which, for any realization of h and d, TQeff = K + d− c0 − h. Then, denoting
total social welfare (the sum of expected seller, buyer and consumer surplus) obtained with
that quantity by Weff , we have
E[Weff ] = E[Πs+Πm+Πc] = E[TQeff (K+d−c0−h− 12TQeff )] =
1
2
((K−c0)2+σ2d+σ2h) .
(37)
Further, define the efficiency loss as
L,E[Weff ]− E[TQ(K + d− c0 − h− 12TQ)] . (38)
Now we can look at the rate of convergence to efficiency when there is such convergence, i.e.,
when 0≤ γo < 1. The following proposition presents this result.
Proposition 6 For 0≤ γo < 1 on any path such that M→∞ and limM,N→∞N/M = k for
a k > 0, there exists a positive constant κ such that
lim
M,N→∞
L·M1−γo = κ . (39)
That is, the efficiency loss is in the order of Mγo−1.
Proposition 6 states that the rate of decrease of the efficiency loss as the number of sellers and
buyers gets large depends on the rate at which information precision decreases as the number
of agents increases. The proposition states that when the rate of individual information
precision decrease is low (i.e. when γo is low), the equilibrium outcome converges to efficiency
faster. This is also in alignment with the rate of convergence to price-taking, i.e., M
γo−1
2 , as
given in part (i) of Proposition 4. On the other hand, as γo approaches 1, convergence slows to
a halt. This is further noteworthy because, considering the equivalence of the market clearing
mechanism to a multi-unit double auction, this result states that with common values and
correlated signals, the convergence rate can be significantly lower than that found in the unit-
demand double auction literature with private values (e.g., Gresik and Satterthwaite 1989,
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Satterthwaite and Williams 1989 and Rustichini et al. 1994) and that found in multi-unit
models with uncorrelated signals (e.g., see Vayanos 1999). Therefore, this result suggests that
in multi-unit auctions with common values and correlated signals, the rate of convergence to
efficiency can be very slow (in fact, arbitrarily slow as γo converges to 1).
The convergence behavior is also consistent with the behavior of the market beyond
γo = 1 and as N and M get large. When γo is equal to or greater than 1, there will always
be efficiency loss, since even when all the information that the agents have in the economy is
aggregated, the true values of d and h (or that of d − h) cannot be known and the efficient
total production quantity will not be achieved. Specifically, when γo > 1, even if the expected
prices and quantities converge to the efficient levels as stated in Proposition 5 (as they do
for 1 < γo < 2), there is always a constant loss due to the total loss of information in the
economy in the limit. At γo = 2, as stated in Proposition 5, prices and the quantities can be
at any efficiency level depending on the parameters. Consequently, the limiting efficiency of
the market can be at any level from maximum efficiency, ignoring the mandatory loss due to
the informational loss, to full inefficiency.
Figure 1 demonstrates how the limiting equilibrium outcome changes with the “noise-to-
signal ratio” σ2uo/σ
2
h for the case γo = 2 for two different values of k. As can be seen from
panel (a), as σ2uo/σ
2
h varies, the expected price of the intermediate good moves from the fully
efficient level (i.e., c0 = 5) to less efficient levels and ultimately to the fully inefficient level
specified by part (b) of Proposition 5. The near full price efficiency is obtained for low levels
of base noise-to-signal ratio, and the price increases as the suppliers’ information becomes less
precise. Similarly, the expected quantity produced is at the efficient level when σ2uo/σ
2
h is low
and decreases rapidly as the ratio increases. Panel (c) shows that despite their large numbers
both on the supplier and the buyer side, the industry participants make profits as a group in
the limit. Considering in this case that the maximum total welfare is 113.5 (from equation
(37)), it is noteworthy that the industry may capture a large percentage of the maximum
possible surplus even if the number of competitors in each layer is very large, as can be seen
from panel (c). Finally, in part (d), we can see that, there is a substantial welfare loss in the
economy despite the large number of buyers and the sellers, which again is in sharp contrast
to the outcome that would be predicted by a price-taking model in the limiting economy. Also
note that increasing the relative concentration of the buyers compared to that of sellers (i.e.,
moving k from 1 to 10 in the figure) tends to increase the clearing price of the intermediate
good and the quantity produced as intuition would suggest. This turns out to decrease the
total industry profits, as can be seen in panel (c), with most of the loss accounting for the
reduced manufacturer profits. The effect on welfare of the relative concentration of buyers
and sellers, on the other hand, is ambiguous as seen in panel (d). Overall, however, Figure 1
also highlights the fact that the relative concentration of buyers and sellers, as their numbers
get large, can be an important determinant of market efficiency. Note that when γo > 2
however, as can be seen from part (iii) of Proposition 5, the only possible outcome in the
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Figure 1: The numerically calculated equilibrium outcome for γo = 2 and M = 106 obtained
by varying σ2uo and σ
2
εo on the surface defined by
σ2d
σ2h
=
√
σ2εo
σ2uo
kγo−1, keeping σ2d and σ
2
h
constant. The parameter values are σ2d = σ
2
h = 1, K = 20, c0 = 5 and N = M ·k. Panel (a)
shows the expected price (E[pe]), panel (b) shows the expected total quantity (E[TQ]), panel
(c) shows the expected total industry profits (E[Πm + Πs]) and panel (d) shows the welfare
loss ratio (L/E[Weff ]).
limit is full loss of efficiency.
An important point here is that these observations are in sharp contrast to what would
have been predicted by price-taking assumptions in the limiting model in which the agents’
signals have no information content: Consider a sequence of economies in our setting where
the agents’ signals are completely uninformative and the numbers of suppliers and manufac-
turers become large. In the unique price-taking equilibrium of each economy in the sequence,
since the marginal cost of production is constant, the clearing price for the intermediate good
has to be c0. Further, as N→∞, the production quantity converges to K − c0, the social
surplus is maximized, and the suppliers and the manufacturers make zero profits. That is,
an economy with a large number of agents behaving strategically and having very little infor-
mation about the uncertainty can be arbitrarily close to being fully inefficient while such an
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economy as predicted by a price-taking analysis should achieve (near) full efficiency. Perhaps
more strikingly, this deviation gets even larger as the economy moves informationally closer
to the benchmark no-information case (i.e., as γo increases). A critical observation here is
that individual information precision can be the key determinant in this outcome and par-
ticularly, agents’ having very inaccurate private information (compared to their having no
information or accurate information) can result in very inefficient outcomes.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I explored the role of information precision on price-taking and efficiency of large
industrial markets with downstream competition. I stated three claims and demonstrated
support for them using a model of an industrial market with private information. First,
whether the agents become price-takers in the limit depends on how the total precision
of the information in the economy changes with increased number of agents. Second, in
industrial markets with downstream competition, whether the agents become price-takers
or not depends on the type of the agents (buyers or sellers) whose number is getting large.
In particular, if the number of buyers becomes large, the interdependence of the utilities of
the buyers can prevent the agents from being price-takers even when the number of buyers
approaches infinity. Third, I claim that, with information effects, increasing the number of
agents can result in agents’ moving further away from price-taking. In fact, I demonstrated
that this effect can be extremely severe to make even the smallest quantities have a very
large impact on the market price and this can affect the market performance dramatically.
Our results also support the claim that in multi-unit double-auctions with common values
and correlated signals, the rate of convergence to efficiency depends on the precision of the
agents’ information and can be significantly slower than that is predicted by the studies on
the single unit double auctions with private values.
In my analysis, I focused on symmetric linear equilibria and normal distributions. Fur-
ther, I assumed a linear end consumer demand curve. These assumptions are necessary for
tractability and are common in analysis of markets with information asymmetry with agents
having correlated signals and multi-unit demands.10 The in-depth analysis of such markets
under private information is nearly impossible under more general distributions and demand
functions. Importantly, although I believe that the main nature of the results will be sus-
tained for more general distributions and demand curves as well, my main goal in this paper
is to demonstrate how precision of private information in large industrial markets can affect
price-taking behavior and consequently how the performance of the market can be affected
10See, e.g., Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Vives (1984), Gal-Or (1985), (1986), Li (1985), Shapiro
(1986), Raith (1996) and Jin (2000) for a sequence of papers that utilize similar assumptions to analyze the
information sharing problem in oligopoly as well as Vayanos (1999) and O’Hara (1997) for such models relating
to financial markets among numerous other sources.
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substantially. Future work that further explores and extends on these results can help shed
more light on the price and surplus formation in large industrial markets with information
asymmetry.
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Appendix
A Mathematical Preliminaries and Definitions
For given αs, βs, let
η1(αs, βs) =
σ2d(α
2
s(N − 1)σ2ε +M(Mσ2h + σ2u)β2s )
(N − 1)(Nσ2d + σ2ε)σ2εα2s +M(Mσ2h + σ2u)(σ2d + σ2ε)β2s
, (A.1)
η2(αs, βs) =
(N − 1)σ2dσ2εαs
(N − 1)(Nσ2d + σ2ε)σ2εα2s +M(Mσ2h + σ2u)(σ2d + σ2ε)β2s
, (A.2)
ν1(αs, βs) =
σ2h(β
2
s (M − 1)σ2u +N(Nσ2d + σ2ε)α2s)
(M − 1)(Mσ2h + σ2u)σ2uβ2s +N(Nσ2d + σ2ε)(σ2h + σ2u)α2s
, (A.3)
ν2(αs, βs) =
(M − 1)σ2hσ2uβs
(M − 1)(Mσ2h + σ2u)σ2uβ2s +N(Nσ2d + σ2ε)(σ2h + σ2u)α2s
, (A.4)
ρ1(αs, βs) =
αsβ
2
sM(Mσ
2
h + σ
2
u)(N − 1)σ2d
(N − 1)(Nσ2d + σ2ε)σ2εα2s +M(Mσ2h + σ2u)(σ2d + σ2ε)β2s
, (A.5)
and
ρ2(αs, βs) =
α2s(N − 1)σ2ε(Nσ2d + σ2ε)
(N − 1)(Nσ2d + σ2ε)σ2εα2s +M(Mσ2h + σ2u)(σ2d + σ2ε)β2s
. (A.6)
Also define
a(r) =
σ2d(r
2(N − 1)σ2ε +M(Mσ2h + σ2u))
(N − 1)(Nσ2d + σ2ε)σ2εr2 +M(Mσ2h + σ2u)(σ2d + σ2ε)
, (A.7)
b(r) =
M(Mσ2h + σ
2
u)(N − 1)σ2d
(N − 1)(Nσ2d + σ2ε)σ2εr2 +M(Mσ2h + σ2u)(σ2d + σ2ε)
, (A.8)
c(r) =
r2(N − 1)σ2dσ2ε
(N − 1)(Nσ2d + σ2ε)σ2εr2 +M(Mσ2h + σ2u)(σ2d + σ2ε)
, (A.9)
d(r) =
r2(N − 1)σ2ε(Nσ2d + σ2ε)
(N − 1)(Nσ2d + σ2ε)σ2εr2 +M(Mσ2h + σ2u)(σ2d + σ2ε)
, (A.10)
f(r) =
σ2hN(Nσ
2
d + σ
2
ε)r
2
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)(σ2h + σ
2
u)r2 + (M − 1)σ2u(Mσ2h + σ2u)
, (A.11)
g(r) =
2(M − 1)σ2u
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)r2 + (M − 1)σ2u
− 1 , (A.12)
e(r) =
Nf(r)r
(M +N − 1)g(r)− (N − 1) , (A.13)
h(r) =
(M − 1)g(r) + 1
(M +N − 1)g(r)− (N − 1) . (A.14)
A.1
Finally, define the relationship“∼” as follows.
Definition: Given two functions, ω and ζ mapping vectors of variables (v, Z) = (v, Z1, ..., Zk),
where v ∈ IRl and l, k, Zi ∈ IN+, to IR, denote
ω∼ ζ as Z1, . . . , Zk→∞ if lim
Z1,...,Zk→∞
ω(v, Z)
ζ(v, Z)
= 1. (A.15)
B Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: We start with necessity. Given other players’ strategies, manu-
facturer i’s problem can be written as
max
Qi
E[Π(Qi, Q−i,Y)|sdi ] ≡ max
Q
E[E[Π(Qi, Q−i,Y)|λ0, sdi ]] , (B.1)
where λ0 is as given in (11). Given (9) and this problem can be solved pointwise. That is for
any given realization of her residual supply curve, manufacturer i solves
max
qi
E[qi(K + d−
∑
k 6=i
(α0i + αssdk + αp(λ0 + λ1qi))− qi − (λ0 + λ1qi))|λ0, sdi ] , (B.2)
where λ1 is again as given in (11). The first order condition is:
K + E[d|λ0, sdi ]−
∑
k 6=i
α0k −E[αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk|λ0, sdi ]− (N − 1)αpλ0
− 2(N − 1)λ1αpqi − 2qiλ0 − 2λ1qi = 0 , (B.3)
and the second order condition is 1 + ((N − 1)αp + 1)λ1 > 0. Notice that, by (9) and (11),
the information contained in λ0 is equivalent to αs
∑
k 6=i s
d
k −
∑M
j=1 βss
c
j . Now d, s
d
i and
αs
∑
k 6=i s
d
k −
∑M
j=1 βss
c
j are jointly normally distributed with means zero and the covariance
matrix σ2dσ2d σ2d + σ2ε
αs(N − 1)σ2d αs(N − 1)σ2d α2s(N − 1)((N − 1)σ2d + σ2ε) +Mβ2s (Mσ2h + σ2u)
 . (B.4)
Similarly, αs
∑
k 6=i s
d
k, s
d
i and αs
∑
k 6=i s
d
k −
∑M
j=1 βss
c
j are jointly normally distributed with
means zero and the covariance matrixα2s(N − 1)((N − 1)σ2d + σ2ε)αs(N − 1)σ2d σ2d + σ2ε
α2s(N − 1)((N − 1)σ2d + σ2ε) αs(N − 1)σ2d α2s(N − 1)((N − 1)σ2d + σ2ε) +Mβ2s (Mσ2h + σ2u)
 .
(B.5)
A.2
From this, it follows that
E[d|sdi , αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk −
M∑
j=1
βss
c
j ] = η1s
d
i + η2(αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk −
M∑
j=1
βss
c
j) , (B.6)
where[
η1
η2
]
=
[
σ2d
σ2d
]
·
[
σ2d + σ
2
ε αs(N − 1)σ2d
αs(N − 1)σ2d α2s(N − 1)((N − 1)σ2d + σ2ε) +Mβ2s (Mσ2h + σ2u)
]−1
=
1
(N − 1)(Nσ2d + σ2ε)σ2εα2s +Mβ2s (Mσ2h + σ2u)(σ2d + σ2ε)
·
[
σ2d(α
2
s(N − 1)σ2ε +Mβ2s (Mσ2h + σ2u))
(N − 1)σ2dσ2εαs
]
, (B.7)
and
E[αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk|sdi , αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk −
M∑
j=1
βss
c
j ] = ρ1s
d
i + ρ2(αs
∑
k 6=i
sdk −
M∑
j=1
βss
c
j) , (B.8)
where[
ρ1
ρ2
]
=
[
α2s(N − 1)((N − 1)σ2d + σ2ε)
αs(N − 1)σ2d
]
·
[
σ2d + σ
2
ε αs(N − 1)σ2d
αs(N − 1)σ2d α2s(N − 1)((N − 1)σ2d + σ2ε) +Mβ2s (Mσ2h + σ2u)
]−1
=
1
(N − 1)(Nσ2d + σ2ε)σ2εα2s +Mβ2s (Mσ2h + σ2u)(σ2d + σ2ε)
·
[
αsMβ
2
s (Mσ
2
h + σ
2
u)(N − 1)σ2d
α2s(N − 1)σ2ε(Nσ2d + σ2ε)
]
, (B.9)
as given in (A.1), (A.2), (A.5) and (A.6). Therefore, by (B.3), it follows that
K + (η1 − ρ1)sdi + (η2 − ρ2)(
M∑
j=1
β0j −
∑
k 6=i
α0k + p(Mβp − (N − 1)αp)− xi)
−
∑
k 6=i
α0k − (N − 1)αpp− (N − 1)λ1αpqi − 2xi − λ0 − 2λ1xi = 0 . (B.10)
From (10) and (B.10), we then have
α0i =
K + (η2 − ρ2)
∑M
j=1 β0j − ((η2 − ρ2) + 1)
∑
k 6=i α0k
2 + η2 − ρ2 + λ1(1 + (N − 1)αp) , 1≤ i≤N, (B.11)
αs =
η1 − ρ1
2 + η2 − ρ2 + λ1(1 + (N − 1)αp) , (B.12)
A.3
and
αp =
M(η2 − ρ2)βp − ((η2 − ρ2) + 1)(N − 1)αp − 1
2 + η2 − ρ2 + λ1(1 + (N − 1)αp) . (B.13)
We next solve the suppliers’ problem. Similar to the manufacturers, suppliers’ problem can
also be solved pointwise. Hence, for a given realization of her residual demand curve, supplier
j solves
max
yj
E[yj(Λ0 + Λ1yj − c0 − h)|Λ0, shj ] (B.14)
where Λ0 and Λ1 are given as in (14). The first order condition is
Λ0 + 2Λ1yj − c0 −E[h|Λ0, scj ] = 0 , (B.15)
and the second order condition is Λ1 < 0. Now notice that, by (12) and (14), the information
contained in Λ0 is equivalent to βs
∑
k 6=i s
c
k − αs
∑N
i=1 s
d
i . Further, h, s
c
j and βs
∑
k 6=i s
c
k −
αs
∑N
i=1 s
d
i are jointly normally distributed with means zero and the covariance matrix σ2hσ2h σ2h + σ2u
βs(M − 1)σ2h βs(M − 1)σ2h β2s (M − 1)((M − 1)σ2h + σ2u) + α2sσ2d
 . (B.16)
Hence
E[h|Λ0, scj ] = ν1scj + ν2(βs
∑
k 6=j
sck − αs
N∑
i=1
sdi ) , (B.17)
where[
ν1
ν2
]
=
[
σ2h
σ2h
]
·
[
σ2h + σ
2
u βs(M − 1)σ2h
βs(M − 1)σ2h β2s (M − 1)((M − 1)σ2h + σ2u) +Nα2s(Nσ2d + σ2ε)
]−1
=
1
(M − 1)(Mσ2h + σ2u)σ2uβ2s +Nα2s(Nσ2d + σ2ε)(σ2h + σ2u)
·
[
σ2h(β
2
s (M − 1)σ2u +Nα2s(Nσ2d + σ2ε))
(M − 1)σ2hσ2uβs
]
. (B.18)
That is, ν1 and ν2 are as given in (A.3) and (A.4). Therefore, from (B.15) and (B.17) we
have
Λ0 + 2Λ1yj − c0 − ν1scj − ν2(
N∑
i=1
α0i −
∑
k 6=j
β0k + p(Nαp − (M − 1)βp)− yj) = 0. (B.19)
Then by (13) and (B.19) we obtain
β0j =
(
∑N
i=1 α0i −
∑
k 6=j β0k)ν2 + c0
Λ1 + ν2
, 1≤ j≤M, (B.20)
βs =
ν1
Λ1 + ν2
(B.21)
A.4
and
βp =
(Nαp − (M − 1)βp)ν2 − 1
Λ1 + ν2
. (B.22)
From (14) and (B.22) we have
βp =
ν2 − Λ1
Λ1(Λ1 + ν2)
. (B.23)
Combining (B.23) with (B.21), defining r = αs/βs, and using the definitions in Appendix A,
we find that
Λ1 =
ν1 − βsν2
βs
=
f(r)
βs
, (B.24)
from which it follows that
βp =
g(r)
Λ1
=
g(r)βs
f(r)
. (B.25)
Substituting the definition of Λ1 into (B.25) we obtain
αp =
((M − 1)g(r) + 1)βs
Nf(r)
(B.26)
which, in turn, yields λ1 = e(r)/αs. Substituting this into (B.12) and solving for αs we obtain
αs =
a(r)h(r)− c(r) + e(r)
(b(r)− (N − 1))h(r)− d(r) . (B.27)
Similarly from (B.13), we obtain
αs =
a(r)− e(r)− c(r)
2 + b(r)− d(r) + (N − 1)h(r) . (B.28)
Hence, we find that equilibrium r must solve
φ(r) = 1 , (B.29)
where φ(r) is given by the left hand side of (18). In addition, from (B.25), it follows that for
βp > 0, g(r) < 0 must hold, which implies
r2 >
(M − 1)σ2u
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)
. (B.30)
The condition αp < 0 implies (M − 1)g(r) + 1 > 0, which in turn yields
r2 <
M(M − 1)σ2u
(M − 2)N(Nσ2d + σ2ε)
. (B.31)
Since αs > 0 and βs < 0 has to hold, r < 0 and we conclude that r has to be in the region
specified by (19). Further, (M − 1)g(r) + 1 > 0 implies −1/(M − 1) < g(r) < 0 which in
turn implies −1/(N − 1) < h(r) < 0. Combining this with (B.28) and since d(r) < 1, it
follows that for αs > 0 (20) must be satisfied. Finally, solving the system of M + N linear
A.5
equations in as many variables described by (B.11) and (B.20) gives (26) and (27). This
proves necessity.
Conversely, suppose a set of coefficients satisfies the conditions described in the proposi-
tion. Then, since (19) is satisfied, r < 0 holds. By (20), αs > 0 and hence βs < 0. Again
by (19), g(r) < 0 and (M − 1)g(r) + 1 > 0, we obtain βp > 0 and αp < 0 and e(r) > 0.
Since αs > 0, we then have λ1 > 0. Further, −1/(N − 1) < h(r) = αpλ1 < 0, which implies
(N − 1)αpλ1+1 > 0. Therefore the second order condition for the manufacturers is satisfied.
Also, βs < 0 implies Λ1 < 0, which means that the second order condition for the suppliers is
also satisfied. Following along the lines given above for the proof of necessity, the candidate
solution also satisfies the first order conditions. This shows sufficiency and completes the
proof . ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: To see part (i), we first examine the behavior of (18) over the
relevant region specified by (19) as M→∞. Plugging in σ2u = Mγsσ2uo and taking the limit
as M→∞ in (19), we see that for any r that satisfies (19)
r∼−M 1+γs2
√
σ2uo
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)
as M→∞ , (B.32)
where the relation “∼” is as defined in Appendix A. Therefore, taking the limit as M→∞,
we then can see that
a(r) ∼ σ
2
d
σ2d + σ
2
ε
, (B.33)
b(r) ∼ (N − 1)σ
2
d
σ2d + σ
2
ε
, (B.34)
c(r) ∼ σ
2
uo(N − 1)σ2dσ2ε
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)σ2h(σ
2
d + σ
2
ε)
Mγs−1 , (B.35)
d(r) ∼ σ
2
uo(N − 1)σ2ε
Nσ2h(σ
2
d + σ
2
ε)
Mγs−1 , (B.36)
and
f(r)∼M−1 , as M→∞. (B.37)
Also, on the range specified by (19), g(r) moves from −1/(M − 1) to 0 and h(r) moves from
0 to −1/(N − 1) monotonically. Further, note that − MM−1 < Mg(r) < 0, which implies that
−1 < lim
M→∞
Mg(r) < 0 . (B.38)
It follows that
e(r)∼σ2uo
√
σ2uo
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)
M
γs−1
2 as M→∞. (B.39)
A.6
Combining (B.33)-(B.37) and (B.39) we then obtain
σ2d
(N + 1)σ2d + σ
2
ε
≤ lim
M→∞
a(r)− c(r)− e(r)
2− d(r) + b(r) + (N − 1)h(r) ≤
σ2d
Nσ2d + σ
2
ε
. (B.40)
From (18), (B.35), (B.36) and (B.39) we then have, φ(rl)→0 asM→∞. Moreover, by (B.33),
(B.35), (B.39) and since h(r)→− 1/(N − 1) there exists r∗ ∈ (rl, rh) such that a(r∗)h(r∗) +
e(r∗)− c(r∗) = 0 for sufficiently large M and h(r∗)(b(r∗)− (N − 1))− d(r∗) > 0. Therefore,
there exists an r0 ∈ (rl, r∗) such that φ(r0) = 1. Further, again by (B.33), (B.35) and (B.39),
(20) is satisfied. Therefore, by Proposition 1, there exists a regular linear symmetric trading
equilibrium. By (B.33)-(B.39) and since h(r) is monotonically increasing on (rl, rh), r0 that
satisfies φ(r0) = 1 is unique on (rl, r∗). Finally, again by monotonicity of h(r), when r > r0,
φ(r) < 0 and consequently, the solution to φ(r0) = 1 is unique on (rl, rh).
Now, plugging (B.33)-(B.35) and the fact that −1/(N−1) < h(r) < 0 in (21), we see that
αs converges to a positive constant as M→∞. By (22) and (B.32), we then have βs being
in the order of M
γs−1
2 as M→∞. Combining this with (22) and by (25) and (B.37), we then
see that Λ1 converges to zero as M
γs−1
2 as M→∞. Further, since αs converges to a constant
and again by (25) and (B.39), we also have λ1 converging to zero as M
γs−1
2 as M→∞. This
completes the proof of part (i).
For part (ii), we will only show part (ii)(a). The proof of part (ii)(b) will be similar in
nature. For γs = 1 again by (19) first notice that
r∼−M
√
σ2uo
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)
as M→∞. (B.41)
From (B.41), taking the limit as M→∞, it follows that
a(r) ∼
σ2d((N − 1)σ2ε σ
2
uo
N(Nσ2d+σ
2
ε)
+ σ2h + σ
2
uo)
N−1
N σ
2
εσ
2
uo + (σ2h + σ
2
uo)(σ2d + σ
2
ε)
, (B.42)
b(r) ∼ σ
2
d(N − 1)(σ2h + σ2uo)
N−1
N σ
2
εσ
2
uo + (σ2h + σ
2
uo)(σ2d + σ
2
ε)
, (B.43)
c(r) ∼
σ2uo(N − 1)σ2dσ2ε σ
2
uo
N(Nσ2d+σ
2
ε)
N−1
N σ
2
εσ
2
uo + (σ2h + σ
2
uo)(σ2d + σ
2
ε)
, (B.44)
d(r) ∼ σ
2
uo
N−1
N σ
2
ε
N−1
N σ
2
εσ
2
uo + (σ2h + σ
2
uo)(σ2d + σ
2
ε)
, (B.45)
and
f(r)∼ σ
2
h
σ2h + 2σ
2
uo
M−1 , as M→∞. (B.46)
Also, again, on the range specified by (19), g(r) moves from −1/(M −1) to 0 and h(r) moves
A.7
from 0 to −1/(N − 1) monotonically. Further,
e(rl)∼
σ2h
√
σ2uo
N(Nσ2d+σ
2
ε)
σ2h + 2σ
2
uo
, and
e(rh)
e(rl)
∼ N
N − 1 as M→∞ . (B.47)
Then
a(r)h(r)+e(r)−c(r)
∣∣∣∣
r=rl
∼
√
σ2uo
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)
(
σ2h
σ2h + 2σ
2
uo
− (N − 1)σ
2
dσ
2
ε
N−1
N σ
2
εσ
2
uo + (σ2d + σ
2
ε)(σ2h + σ
2
uo)
)
,
(B.48)
and
a(r)h(r) + e(r)− c(r)
∣∣∣∣
r=rh
∼
1
N − 1
(Nσ2h√ σ2uoN(Nσ2d+σ2ε)
σ2h + 2σ
2
uo
−
(N − 1)2σ2dσ2ε
√
σ2uo
N(Nσ2d+σ
2
ε)
− σ2d(σ2h + σ2uo + (N−1)σ
2
εσ
2
uo
N(Nσ2d+σ
2
ε)
)
N−1
N σ
2
εσ
2
uo + (σ2d + σ
2
ε)(σ2h + σ
2
uo)
)
.
(B.49)
Now by (B.48), as σ2uo→0, a(r)h(r) + e(r) − c(r)|r=rl ∼ 0 and if σ2h >
(N−1)σ2dσ2ε
σ2d+σ
2
ε
, a(r)h(r) +
e(r) − c(r) > 0|r=rl . Moreover, a(r)h(r) + e(r) − c(r)|r=rh ∼ − σ
2
d
σ2d+σ
2
ε
. Therefore, if σ2h is
sufficiently large, there exists r∗ in (19), for which a(r∗)h(r∗) + e(r∗) − c(r∗) = 0. Noting
that h(r)(b(r)− (N − 1))− d(r) is monotonic on (19), there are two cases: If, h(r∗)(b(r∗)−
(N − 1))− d(r∗) > 0, then there exists an r0 ∈ (rl, r∗) such that φ(r0) = 1. If h(r∗)(b(r∗)−
(N − 1))− d(r∗) < 0 on the other hand, by (B.42)-(B.47) φ(rh)∼ − (N−1)σ
2
ε
Nσ2d+σ
2
ε
< 0 there exists
an r0 ∈ (r∗, rh) such that φ(r0) = 1. In both cases, since a− e− c is increasing on (19) and
since by (B.42)-(B.47) a(rl) − e(rl) − c(rl)∼ σ
2
d
σ2d+σ
2
ε
> 0 as M→∞, so (20) is satisfied at r0.
Therefore, by Proposition 1, if σ2uo is small enough and σ
2
h is large enough, there exists a
regular symmetric trading equilibrium.
Now take any sequence of regular symmetric trading equilibria asM→∞ and with γs = 1.
Then, by (21), (B.42)-(B.47) and since (18) is polynomial, we have αs converge to a constant
as M→∞. Therefore by (25) and (B.46), we then see that Λ1 converges to a constant as
M→∞. Further, since αs converges to a constant and again by (25) and (B.47), we also have
λ1 converging a constant as M→∞. This completes the proof of part (ii).
Finally for part (iii), notice that
r∼ −
√
σ2uo
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)
M1+γs , (B.50)
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as M→∞. Then, again taking the limit as M→∞, we have
a(r)∼
σ2d(1 +
(N−1)σ2ε
N(Nσ2d+σ
2
ε)
)
σ2d + σ
2
ε(1 +
N−1
N )
, b(r)∼ (N − 1)σ
2
d
σ2d + σ
2
ε(1 +
N−1
N )
, (B.51)
c(r)∼
σ2d
(N−1)σ2ε
N(Nσ2d+σ
2
ε)
σ2d + σ
2
ε(1 +
N−1
N )
and d(r)∼ (N − 1)σ
2
ε
σ2d + σ
2
ε(1 +
N−1
N )
, (B.52)
as M→∞. Further, f(r)∼σ2h/(2σ2u),
e(rl)∼ f(r)
√
σ2uo
N(Nσ2d + σ
2
ε)
M
1+γs
2 and e(rh)∼ (N/(N − 1))e(rl) (B.53)
as M→∞. Combining these with the fact that on the range specified by (19), g(r) moves
from −1/(M − 1) to 0 and h(r) moves from 0 to −1/(N − 1) monotonically, we obtain
φ(rl)∼ d(r)2− d(r) + b(r) < 1 and φ(rl)∼ −
1− b(r)N−1 − d(r)
1 + b(r)− d(r) < 0 , (B.54)
and since by (18) and (B.53), φ is monotonically increasing with h and consequently decreas-
ing with r on (19), we conclude that for large enough M , (18) cannot have a solution on (19)
and hence a regular linear symmetric trading equilibrium cannot exist. This concludes the
proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: We again start by examining the behavior of (18) over the
relevant region given in (19). For simplicity in exposition, we also start by first assuming
0 < γm < 1. Later, we will complete the case for γm = 0 where there is a difference. Since
σ2ε = ϕ(N)σ
2
εo∼Nγσ2εo as N→∞ and taking the limit as N→∞ in (19), we see that for any
r in (19)
r∼−N−1
√
(M − 1)σ2u
σ2d
%(r) asM→∞, (B.55)
where
%(r) =
1−
√
M
M−2
rh(N)− rl(N)(r − rl(N)) +
√
M
M − 2 . (B.56)
Now,
a(r) ∼ Mσ
2
d(Mσ
2
h + σ
2
u)
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
N−γm , (B.57)
b(r) ∼ Mσ
2
d(Mσ
2
h + σ
2
u)
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
N1−γm , (B.58)
c(r) ∼ σ
2
uσ
2
εo%
2(r)(M − 1)
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
N−1 , (B.59)
d(r) ∼ (M − 1)σ
2
uσ
2
εo%
2(r)
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
, (B.60)
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and
f(r)∼ σ
2
h%(r)
(σ2h + σ
2
u)%2(r) +Mσ2h + σ
2
u
, as N→∞. (B.61)
Also, again, on the range specified by (19), g(r) moves from −1/(M −1) to 0 and h(r) moves
from 0 to −1/(N − 1) monotonically. It then follows that
e(rl)∼
M(M − 1)σ2h
√
(M−1)σ2u
σ2d
M(2M − 1)σ2h + (M2 +M − 2)σ2u
N−1, (B.62)
and
e(rh)∼
σ2h
√
(M−1)σ2u
σ2d
(M + 1)σ2h + 2σ
2
u
N−1 as N→∞. (B.63)
Combining (B.57)-(B.61), (B.62) and (B.63) we then obtain
lim
N→∞
a(r)− c(r)− e(r)
2− d(r) + b(r) + (N − 1)h(r) = 1. (B.64)
By multiplying the numerator and denominator of left hand side of (18) by Nγm and by
(B.57)-(B.63) we then have
φ(rl)∼
(Mσ2h + 2σ
2
u)
√
σ2d(M − 1)σ2u
(Mσ2h + 2σ
2
u)
√
σ2d(M − 1)σ2u − (M(M − 2)σ2h + (2M − 3)σ2u)
√
M
M−2
, (B.65)
and
φ(rh)∼ M(Mσ
2
h + σ
2
u)(M + 1)σ
2
h + 2σ
2
u
(M2σ2h + (2M − 1)σ2u)σ2h
√
(M−1)σ2u
σ2d
− (M − 1)σ2u((M + 1)σ2h + 2σ2u)
as N→∞.
(B.66)
From (B.65) and (B.66) we can then see that as σ2d gets large, φ(rl)→1+ and φ(rh)→ −
M(Mσ2h+su)
(M−1)σ2u with φ having no singularities on (19) for 0 < γm < 1. On the other hand, for
γm = 0 we have
c(r)∼ σ
2
uσ
2
εo%
2(r)(M − 1)
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
N−1 , (B.67)
and
d(r)∼ σ
2
uσ
2
εo%
2(r)(M − 1)
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
. (B.68)
Therefore φ(rl)→ and φ(rh)→0 as N→∞. Further, as σ2d gets large, by (B.62) and (B.67),
we see that e(r)− c(r)→0+ on (19). On the other hand,
a(rl)h(rl) = 0 and a(rh)h(rh)∼− M(Mσ
2
h + σ
2
u)σ
2
d
(N − 1)(M(Mσ2h + σ2u)σ2d + (M2σ2h + (2M − 1)σ2u)σ2εo)
,
(B.69)
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as N→∞. Therefore φ has a singularity on (19) and hence a solution to φ(z) = 1.
Therefore, in both cases, we conclude that there exists σ2d > 0 such that when σ
2
d > σ
2
d,
(18) has a solution on (19). Further, by (B.57), (B.57), (B.62) and (B.63), (20) is satisfied
and therefore a regular linear symmetric trading equilibrium exists.
Now let any such equilibrium be given. By (21), and (B.57)-(B.63) we then have αs∼N−1.
Further, then by (22) and (B.55), βs converges to a constant as N→∞. From (A.13), (B.61)
and (25), we then conclude that ∃ λ∗ > 0 and Λ∗ < 0 such that limN→∞ λ1 = λ∗ and
limN→∞ Λ1 = Λ∗.
For the case with γm = 1, plugging in σ2ε = N
γσ2εo and taking the limit as N→∞ in (19),
we see that for any r in (19)
r∼−N−1
√
(M − 1)σ2u
σ2d + σ
2
εo
%(r) asM→∞, (B.70)
where %(r) is as defined in (B.56). We then have
a(r) ∼
σ2d((M − 1)σ2u
σ2d
σ2d+σ
2
εo
+M(Mσ2h + σ
2
u))
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
N−1 , (B.71)
b(r) ∼ Mσ
2
d(Mσ
2
h + σ
2
u)
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
, (B.72)
and
c(r)∼
σ2uσ
2
εo%
2(r)(M − 1) σ2d
σ2d+σ
2
εo
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
N−1 . (B.73)
d(r) and f(r) still satisfy (B.60) and (B.61) and e(rl) and e(rh) are scaled by
√
σ2d/(σ
2
d + σ
2
ε)
compared to (B.62) and (B.63). Keeping in mind that on the range specified by (19), g(r)
moves from −1/(M−1) to 0 and h(r) moves from 0 to −1/(N−1) monotonically. Combining
these with (B.61), (B.71) and (B.72) we then obtain
lim
N→∞
a(r)− c(r)− e(r)
2− d(r) + b(r) + (N − 1)h(r) = 1 +
(M − 1)σ2uσ2d
M(Mσ2h + σ
2
u)(σ2d + σ
2
εo)
. (B.74)
Given these, the rest of the proof of existence is similar to the 0 < γ < 1 case. Further, the
existence of λ∗ > 0 and Λ∗ < 0 such that limN→∞ λ1 = λ∗ and limN→∞ Λ1 = Λ∗ follows
similarly. This completes the proof of part (i).
To see part (ii), note that for γ > 1
r∼ −
√
(M − 1)σ2u
N1+γmσ2εo
%(r) as N→∞ . (B.75)
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It follows that
a(r) ∼ σ
2
d(M − 1)σ2u%2(r)
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
N−γm , (B.76)
c(r) ∼ σ
2
u(M − 1)σ2d%2(r)
σ2εo(M2σ2h + (M + (M − 1)%2(r))σ2u)
N−γm , (B.77)
and f(r) still satisfies (B.61). Then, by (A.13), on (19), we have
lim
N→∞
M(M − 1)σ2h
√
(M−1)σ2u
σ2εo
e(r)(M(2M − 1)σ2h + (M2 +M − 2)σ2u)
N−
1+γm
2 ≥ 1 . (B.78)
By (B.76)-(B.78), it then follows that (20) is violated on (19) as N→∞ and therefore, there
cannot be a regular symmetric linear trading equilibrium. This completes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof of parts (i) and (ii) are similar in nature to those for
Propositions 2, and 3 and therefore skipped here.
To see part (iii), first note that since σ2ε = ϕm(N)σ
2
εo∼Nγoσ2εo as N→∞,
σ2u = ϕs(M)σ
2
uo∼Mγoσ2uo and limN,M→∞ NM = k, taking the limit as N,M→∞ in (19), we
see that for any r in (19)
r∼−
√
σ2uo
k1+γoσ2εo
asM→∞, (B.79)
Therefore, and taking the limit as N and M→∞, we then can see that, for r in (19)
a(r)∼ σ2d
σ2εok
γoM
−γo , b(r)∼ σ2d
2σ2εok
γo−1M
1−γo , c(r)∼ σ2d
2σ2εok
γoM
−γo , d(r)∼12 and f(r)∼
σ2h
2σ2uo
M−γo .
Further, e(r)∼ σ2h
2σ2uo
√
σ2uo
k1+γoσ2εo
M−γo . This means that
φ(r)∼ (a(r)− e(r)− c(r))(−h(r)(N − 1)−
1
2)
(32 + (N − 1)h(r))(a(r)h(r) + e(r)− c(r))
(B.80)
Now, first suppose (36) does not hold. Then by (B.80)
φ(rl)∼−
σ2d
2σ2εok
γo − σ
2
h
2σ2uo
√
σ2uo
k1+γoσ2εo
3( σ
2
h
2σ2uo
√
σ2uo
k1+γoσ2εo
− σ2d
2σ2εok
γo )
∼ 1
3
, (B.81)
and similarly, φ(rh)∼ − 1 as N→∞. Further, by (B.80), φ is increasing over (19) in h(r),
which means it is decreasing in r and therefore there cannot be a solution to (18) and hence
no regular linear symmetric trading equilibrium exists.
Now suppose (36) holds. Then limM→∞Mγo(e(r) − c(r)) = 0 and limM→∞Mγo(a(r) −
e(r)− c(r)) = 0. Further, carrying out the algebra and imposing (36) we have
e(r)− c(r)
a(r)
∼

1
4
( (σ2h)2
σ2dσ
2
uo
− x(r)k
)
M−(γo−1), 1 < γo < 2;
1
4
( (σ2h)2
σ2dσ
2
uo
+ 3−x(r)k
)
M−1, γo = 2;
3−x(r)
4k M
−1, 2 < γo;
(B.82)
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and
a(r)− e(r)− c(r)
a(r)
∼

1
4
(σ2h(2σ2d+σ2h)
σ2dσ
2
uo
− (2k − 1)x(r)k
)
M−(γo−1), 1 < γo < 2;
1
4
(σ2h(2σ2d+σ2h)
σ2dσ
2
uo
+ (2k − 1)1−x(r)k
)
M−1, γo = 2;
(2k − 1)1−x(r)4k M−1, 2 < γo;
(B.83)
as M,N→∞, where
x(r) =
2(r2h − r2)
r2h − r2l
, rl < r < rh. (B.84)
Using (B.82) and (B.83) we can then analyze (18) asM→∞. Here, we will only demonstrate
the case for 1 < γo < 2. The other cases will be similar. First, by (A.13), (A.14) and (B.84)
we have
h(r)(N − 1) ∼ − 2− x(r)
2− 2k+1(N−1)x(r)
∼ x(r)
2
− 1 , (B.85)
as M,N→∞. By (B.82), (B.83) and (B.85) we have
φ(r) ∼
(σ2h(2σ2d+σ2h)
σ2dσ
2
uo
− 2k−14k x(r)
)
M−(γo−1)(1− x(r))
(1 + x(r))(h(r) +
( (σ2h)2
σ2dσ
2
uo
− x(r)4k
)
M−(γo−1))
. (B.86)
as M,N→∞. Then (excluding the case x(r)6=4k(σ2h)2/σ2dσ2uo which can be ignored for our
purpose) (18) tends to
k
2
x2(r)− (k − 1
2
+ k
2σ2h(σ
2
d + σ
2
h)
σ2dσ
2
uo
)x(r) + k
σ2hσ
2
d
σ2dσ
2
uo
= 0 . (B.87)
It is easy to show that ∃ σ2h > 0 and σ2uo > 0 such that when σ2h > σ2h or 0 < σ2uo < σ2uo, there
exists a (unique) solution x(r) ∈ (0, 2) to (B.87). Combining this with (B.83) and (B.84),
it then follows that there exists a (unique) solution to (18) on (19) that satisfies (20) and
consequently, by Proposition (1), a linear symmetric trading equilibrium exists for M , N
large enough.
Now take any such sequence of equilibria as M,N→∞. In that sequence, x(r∗)→x∗,
where x ∈ (0, 2) is a root of (B.87). Then
αs∼
(σ2h(2σ2d+σ2h)
σ2dσ
2
uo
− 2k−14k x∗
)
M−2γo+1
2(1 + x∗)
. (B.88)
By (22) and (B.79) we also have βs∼−
(σ2h(2σ2d+σ2h)
σ2dσ
2
uo
− 2k−14k x∗
)√σ2εokγo+1
σ2uo
(2(1+x∗))−1M−2γo+1.
Then Λ1 = f(r∗)/βs∼ (σ2h/2σ2uoβs)M−γo→−∞, and λ1 = e(r∗)/αs∼ (σ2h/2σ2uoαs)M−γo→∞
as M,N→∞. This completes the proof. ¥
A.13
Proof of Proposition 5: We start with the case 1 < γo < 2. First notice that, by (3), (7),
(8), (26) and (27), we have
E[pe] =
∑N
i=1 α0i −
∑M
j=1 β0j
Mβp −Nαp =
Λ1Nα0 −Mc0
(Mβp −Nαp)(Λ1 +Mν2) . (B.89)
By (B.83) and (B.85) αs∼α∗sM−2γo+1, βs∼−α∗s
√
k1+γoσ2uo
σ2εo
M−2γo+1, Λ1∼− σ
2
h
2σ2uoα
∗
s
√
σ2εok
1+γo
σ2uo
Mγo−1
and λ1∼ σ
2
h
2σ2uoα
∗
s
√
σ2εo
k1+γoσ2uo
Mγo−1, as M,N→∞ where x∗ is the solution to (B.87). Then, by
(26), we have
Nα0 =
K +Mc0 η2−ρ2Λ1+Mν2
1 + Λ1 η2−ρ2Λ1+Mν2
. (B.90)
Now, by (A.2), (A.4) and (A.6), we also have
η2 ∼ σ
2
dr
2
0
α∗s(σ2εo + σ2uor20)
Mγo−1 , (B.91)
ρ2 ∼ σ
2
εok
γo
σ2εo + σ2uor20
, (B.92)
and
ν2 ∼ − σ
2
h
2σ2uoα∗s
√
σ2εok
1+γo
σ2uo
Mγo−1 , (B.93)
as M,N→∞, where r0 = σ
2
εok
1+γo
σ2uo
. Therefore, by (B.89) and (B.90), and since
Mβp −Nαp ∼ − 1Λ1 , (B.94)
we have
E[pe] ∼
− σ2h
2σ2uoα
∗
s
√
σ2εok
1+γo
σ2uo
Mγo−1K −Mc0
−M ∼ c0 , (B.95)
as M,N→∞. This completes the proof of part (i).
To see part (ii), following similar steps as given for γo < 2 in part (i) above and part
(iii) of Proposition 4, we can find that αs∼α∗sM−3, βs ∼ −α
∗
s
r0
M−3, Λ1∼ − σ
2
hr0
2σ2uoα
∗
s
M ,
λ1 ∼ σ
2
hr0
2σ2uoα
∗
s
M , as M,N→∞, where
α∗s =
2(σ
2
h(2σ
2
d+σ
2
h)
4σ2dσ
2
uo
+ 2k−14k (1− x∗))
1 + x∗
, (B.96)
and x∗ is the solution to the quadratic equation
k
2
x2 + (1− k(1 + σ
2
h(σ
2
d + σ
2
h)
2σ2dσ
2
uo
))x+
k
2
(1− (σ
2
h)
2
2σ2dσ
2
uo
) = 0 (B.97)
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subject to σ
2
h(2σ
2
d+σ
2
h)
4σ2dσ
2
uo
+ 2k−14k (1 − x∗) > 0. It can be shown that for small enough σ2uo/σ2h,
such a solution always exists and (20) is satisfied. Further, note that calling λ∗1 =
σ2hr0
2σ2uoα
∗
s
,
and utilizing (36), as σ2uo/σ
2
h goes to an upper limit on the extended positive real line, λ
∗
1
converges to ∞ and as σ2uo/S→0, λ∗1 converges to 0.
Taking the limits, we have Mν2∼ − σ
2
hr0
2σ2uoα
∗
s
M2, η2∼ σ
2
d
2α∗sk2σ2εo
M and ρ2 converges to a
constant as M,N→∞. Noting that σ2d/(k2σ2εo) = σ2hr0σ2uo since (36), it follows that
η2 − ρ2
Λ1 +Mν2
∼ − 1
M
asM,N→∞. (B.98)
By (B.89), (B.90) and calling λ∗1 =
σ2hr0
2σ2uoα
∗
s
, we then have
N∑
i=1
α0i ∼ k(K − c0)
λ∗1(k + 1) + k
, (B.99)
and E[pe] ∼ τK + (1− τ)c0 as M,N→∞, where
τ =
λ∗1k
λ∗1(k + 1) + k
. (B.100)
Combining this with the fact that λ∗1 ranges from 0 to∞ for different values of (σ2d, σ2h, σ2uo, σ2εo),
it follows that for any p∈(c0, kK+c0k+1 ), there exists a (σ2d, σ2h, σ2uo, σ2εo)∈IR4+ such that E[pe]→p.
Now
E[TQ] =
N∑
i=1
α0i +NαpE[pe]. (B.101)
Notice that MNαp converges to a constant as M,N→∞. Then, for any given p, by writing
τ and λ∗1 in terms of E[pe], substituting in (B.99), we obtain E[TQ]→K − p− 1k (p− c0), as
E[pe]→p.
Finally, to see part (iii), first, by following similar steps as given in the proof of part (iii)
of Proposition (4) this time for γo > 2, we obtain the quadratic equation
2(x(r∗)− 1)(k − 1− kx(r∗)) = 0 (B.102)
as the analogue of (B.87). Further, by (18), (21) (B.82) and (B.83),
α∗s ∼
(2k − 1)(1− x(r∗))
2(1 + x(r∗))
(B.103)
and when x(r∗)6=1
(2k − 1)(1− x(r∗))
2(1 + x(r∗))
∼ −1
2
(B.104)
has to hold as M,N→∞. Now for (k − 1)/k to be a valid solution to (B.103), k≥ 1 has to
hold. On the other hand, when k≥ 1, (B.104) cannot be satisfied for x(r∗) = (k − 1)/k < 1.
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Therefore, x(r∗) = 1 can be the only valid solution to (B.102). By (B.103), it then follows
that αs∼α∗sM−(γo+1+δ), βs ∼ −α
∗
s
r0
M−(γo+1+δ), Λ1∼ − σ
2
hr0
2σ2uoα
∗
s
M1+δ, λ1 ∼ σ
2
hr0
2σ2uoα
∗
s
M1+δ,
as M,N→∞, where δ , α∗s > 0. Again taking the limits, we have Mν2∼ − σ
2
hr0
2σ2uoα
∗
s
M2+δ,
η2∼ σ
2
d
2α∗sk2σ2εo
M1+δ and ρ2∼12 asM,N→∞. Noting again that σ2d/(k2σ2εo) = σ2hr0/σ2uo by (36),
it follows that η2−ρ2Λ1+Mν2 ∼ − 1M asM,N→∞. Further, substituting this into (B.89) and (B.90)
N∑
i=1
α0i ∼ k(K − c0)
λ∗1(k + 1) + k
M−δ , (B.105)
and
E[pe]∼kK + c0
k + 1
(B.106)
follow, asM,N→∞,. The fact that E[TQ]→0, asM,N→∞, then follows by (B.101), (B.105)
and since M1+δNαp converges to a constant as , as M,N→∞. This completes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6: First, notice that for any r in (19),
r∼−
√
σ2uo
k2σ2d
, (B.107)
as M,N→∞. From this, it follows that
a(r)∼ σ
2
d
kγo
M−γo and b(r)∼ k
1−γoσ2d
σ2εo
M1−γo , (B.108)
and the other terms in (21) are of lower order as M,N→∞. From this, and again by taking
the limit as N,M→∞, it follows that
αs∼1
k
M−1 , βs∼− 1
kr0
M−
γo+1
2 , (B.109)
Λ1∼ − kroM
γo−1
2 and λ1∼ kr0M
γo−1
2 , (B.110)
where r0 =
√
σ2uo/(k2σ2d). By taking the limits as N,M→∞, we also have
Mν2∼ − kr0M
1+γo
2 , and η2∼ ρ2∼ σ
2
uo
σ2h
Mγo−1 . (B.111)
By (3), (7), (8), (26), (27), (B.90) and by Taylor expansion we then have
pe∼ c0 + kKr0M
γo−3
2 + (d− h+ 1
Mk
N∑
i=1
εi − 1
M
M∑
j=1
uj)kr0M
γo−1
2 , (B.112)
A.16
as M,N→∞. Again by (7), (B.90) and Taylor expansion it then follows that
TQ∼K+d−(c0+h)−K
N
(d−h)kr0M
γo−1
2 −kKr0M
γo−3
2 +(
1
Mk
N∑
i=1
εi− 1
M
M∑
j=1
uj)(1−kr0M
γo−1
2 ) .
(B.113)
Using the definition of the welfare loss, and plugging in (B.113) we then have
L∼Mγo−1(kro(σ2d + σ2h) + σ2εokγo−1 + σ2uo) , (B.114)
which completes the proof. ¥
A.17
